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Single Idea 10719

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties ]

Full Idea

Four adequacy conditions for particulars and properties: asymmetry of instantiation; different particulars can have the same property; particulars can have many properties; two properties can be instantiated by the same particulars.

Gist of Idea

There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties

Source

Alex Oliver (The Metaphysics of Properties [1996], §09)

Book Ref

-: 'Mind' [-], p.20


A Reaction

The distinction between particulars and universals has been challenged (e.g. by Ramsey and MacBride). There are difficulties in the notion of 'instantiation', and in the notion of two properties being 'the same'.


The 35 ideas with the same theme [what we should take a property to be]:

There cannot be uninstantiated properties [Aristotle, by Macdonald,C]
Properties are just the ways in which forms are realised at various times [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
The 'propriae' or 'necessary accidents' of a thing are separate, and derived from the essence [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle]
Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus]
Each object has a precise number of properties, each to a precise degree [Fichte]
Frege treats properties as a kind of function, and maybe a property is its characteristic function [Frege, by Smith,P]
The category of objects incorporates the old distinction of substances and their modes [Quine]
Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had' [Chisholm]
Some properties can never be had, like being a round square [Chisholm]
Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil]
All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong]
Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis]
The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property [Ellis]
A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker]
I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker]
Formerly I said properties are individuated by essential causal powers and causing instantiation [Shoemaker, by Shoemaker]
Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson]
Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker]
Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them [Lewis]
The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy [Lewis]
Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed? [Lewis]
Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis]
Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann]
If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar]
If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete? [Oliver]
There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties [Oliver]
Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer]
If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer]
Can properties have parts? [Swoyer]
Maybe the only properties are basic ones like charge, mass and spin [Hawley]
Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber]
Properties only have identity in the context of their contraries [Elder]
Humeans see properties as having no more essential features and relations than their distinctness [Friend/Kimpton-Nye, by PG]
Dispositions are what individuate properties, and they constitute their essence [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]